[국제협상] The Third Taiwan Strait Crisis(1995-1996)(영문)

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[국제협상] The Third Taiwan Strait Crisis(1995-1996)(영문)에 대한 자료입니다.
목차
1. Introduction

2. The Sequence of Events
2.1. May 1995 – February 1996: the Escalation of Conflict
2.2. March 1996: the Escalation and Dissolution of the Crisis

3. Interests of Each Players
3.1. China
3.2. Taiwan
3.3. United States

4. A Game Theory Analysis: How was total war avoided?

5. Evaluation
5.1. Costs and Benefits: who gained what and lost what?
5.2. Alternatives and Options: could the Crisis have been avoided?
5.3. Relationship: how did the Crisis affect Sino-Taiwan-U.S. relations?

6. Conclusion
본문내용
1. Introduction
The Third Taiwan Strait Crisis refers to the escalation of military conflict that occurred between China and Taiwan from May 1995 to March 1996. China and Taiwan has been competing over sovereignty and security issues for more than half a century, and the conflict between them is one of the biggest threats to the stability of Northeast Asia. The Taiwan Strait Crisis is a good example of how potentially dangerous Sino-Taiwan conflict can become, and we believe it is important to find out how the crisis was resolved. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the nature of the conflict between the three countries and find out how the crisis ended without escalating into war, using game theory and the elements of negotiation.

2. The Sequence of Events
2.1. May 1995 – February 1996: the Escalation of Conflict
In May 1995, the White House granted President Lee Tung-hui of Taiwan to visit Cornell University, to deliver a speech. While Lee’s visit was supposedly unofficial and personal, the decision caused a great stir in China. China saw Lee’s visit as an extension of his “vacation diplomacy ” an endeavor to increase Taiwan’s visibility and status in the international arena through unofficial visits to various countries. China also felt betrayed by the U.S., who publicly supported the One-China policy since the two countries normalized relations in 1972.
Beijing reacted by taking both diplomatic and military measures. In June, it recalled its ambassador in Washington and put off approving the new U.S. ambassador to China and canceled the scheduled visits to Washington by Defense Minister Chi Haotian and State Counselor Li Guixian. As a warning toward Taipei, Beijing suspended the second round of Wang-Koo talks, semi-official talks between China and Taiwan which discussed reconciliatory measures in cross-Strait relations, which was scheduled to take place in July. Furthermore, on July 21 to 25, it conducted missile tests and military exercises in the waters near Taiwan.
Washington tried to assure Beijing that it was still committed to the One China policy. On August 1, Christopher delivered U.S. President Clinton’s confidential letter to Chinese President Jiang Zemin, which stated that the United States supported the One China policy and opposed Taiwan independence. However, Beijing was not satisfied with mere promises; it wanted “concrete actions ” on Washington’s
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