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[북한경제의이해] 베트남과 북한 경제 정책에 영향을 준 외부적 요인들(번역)에 대한 자료입니다.
목차
Introduction
Pre- Gorbachev Soviet- Vietnames Discord
Soviet-Vietnamese Trade and the Debate over Industrialization
The Vietnamese Leadership's Dilemmas in 1986
The 6th VCP Congress: :Long Procrastination after a Good Start
Unresolved Diplomatic Problems: An Obstacle to Economic Reform?
Towards a Breakthrough: Hanoi Finds New Parters
"The Light at the End of the Tunnel": A Turning Point in Foreign Policy and Economic Reform
Why did Vietnam's Early Reform Measures Fail?
“Muddling Through" in North Korea, 1951-1990
From the Famine to Reforms of July 2002
Conclusion: Differences between Vietnam and North Korea
Construction of Rule by Law in China during Modernization of Economy
Ce Wang
(Chiness Academy of Social Sciences in Liaoning)
1. Building market economy according to the notion of rule by law
1) Breeding main body for market economy
2) Establishing innovated mechanism, developing new product force
3) Developing financial supporting system, ensuring capital flow for enterprise.
4) Improving supervising system to market
5) Protecting environment and natural resource
2. How far are we to the modernization?
1) Chinese economic modernization in present-day
2) How to develop Chinese modernization
본문내용
Pre- Gorbachev Soviet- Vietnames Discord
To answer the aforesaid question, we need evidence, above all, from the vietnamese and Russian archives, but it may also be useful to study the declassified reports of the East European Communist diplomats who were accredited to Hanoi in the 1980s. Namely, the Hungarian diplomats whose reports I read managed to collect an impressive amount of confidential information about economic matters, state- society relations, and diplomatic negotiations, because many VCP cadres, having conversations with the "fraternal" diplomats, skpe about the country's internal problems with remarkable frankness.
A careful analysis of these documents reveals that the limits of Moscow's commitment to Hanoi started to manifest themselves several years before Gorbachev's perestroika. for instance, in October 1983 a Soviet party and government delegation headed by Gaidar Aliyev visited Vietnam. Aliyev sharply criticized the deficiencies of Vietnamese economic policies, particularly the inefficeint use of Soviet aid. He also pressured Hanoi to increase its exports, pointing out that while the value of Soviet exports to Vietnam stood at 700 million rubles, Vietnamese exports did not exceed 3000million rubles. Revealing Moscow's import preferences, Aliyev expressed much more readiness to help Vietnam in constructinj fruit and vegetable processing plats than to assist the development of heavy industry. Among others, he bluntly rejected Hanoi's requests for a nuclear power pant and a new hydropower station on the grounds that these projects would be too costly and excessively ambitious.
It may be noted that Aliyev's debate with the VCP leaders occurred in a period when Soviet and Vietnamese strategic interests started to diverge from each other. From 1981 on, the Kremlin made persistent efforts to reach reconciliation with China, a precess viewed with distrust by Hanoi. Hanoi's reluctance to follow Moscow's example seems to have induced the CPSU leadership to put pressure on its independent-minded ally. Noteworthily, Aliyev's clash with the VCP leaders took