A Debate on Corporate Governance of Family Firms and Business Groups
사회과학 > 경제학
( Chang Min Lee ) , ( Hong Chong Cho ) , ( Gyoung Goo Kang )
이화여자대학교 국제지역연구소(구 이화여자대학교 국제통상협력연구소)
International Studies Review 2011년, 제12권 제2호, 25~45쪽(총21쪽)
87100393.pdf [무료 PDF 뷰어 다운로드]
  • ※ 본 자료는 참고용 논문으로 수정 및 텍스트 복사가 되지 않습니다.
  • 구매가격
    153원 (구매자료 3% 적립)
    이메일 발송  스크랩 하기
    자료 다운로드  네이버 로그인
    This article reviews corporate governance literature of family firms and business groups which is relevant to Korean conglomerates. We summarize major issues on corporate governance for Korean conglomerates and classify studies according to those issues: existence of controlling shareholder, deviation from the one share-one vote principle, family members` participation in management, succession of control to family members, and the relationship between financial and industrial capital within business groups. Existing literature shows that firms with controlling shareholders are common globally. While many factors related to corporate governance impact firm value, they create both positive and negative ramifications in a nuanced manner. Also, corporate governance endogenously emerges under different circumstances-law, degree of market development, or management-union relations across countries. Thus, there is no strict standard corporate governance system that can apply to all family business groups in different countries. Proper frameworks for policy makers and managers will arise only in the particular contexts in which family business groups operate.
    사업자등록번호 220-87-87785 대표.신현웅 주소.서울시 서초구 방배로10길 18, 402호 대표전화.070-8809-9397
    개인정보책임자.박정아 통신판매업신고번호 제2017-서울서초-1765호 이메일 help@reportshop.co.kr
    copyright (c) 2009 happynlife. steel All reserved.