|Domestically produced and ‘Han-woo’ labeled beef in Korea can be regarded as a credence good because consumers ‘believe’ the beef is correctly labeled and they are willing to pay higher price. However, the price premium of Han-woo, about twice higher than imported beef, is strong incentive for marketers to cheat. Therefore, the issue of information asymmetry arises: sellers may have superior information than buyers. To measure the level of information asymmetry, Shannon’s Information Entropy, a measure of uncertainty (1 for most uncertain, 0 for certain), is standardized and used. To calculate the probability of cheating, that is used to calculate the Information Entropy, a Bayesian game model is constructed and solved using Gambit, a game model solver. Other than importers, three types of marketers of slaughters, packers and wholesalers are considered at wholesale stage. For resale stage, 6 types of retailers of direct chain stores, processors, caterers, meat stores, restaurants and discount/department stores are considered. Finally consumers are considered as players. The result indicates that when control agency’s effort increase in terms of probability of disclosure, the information asymmetry will be improved only up to 0.63 even when the control agency increase the probability of disclosure above 0.10, which should be the control agency’s goal under the fixed level of fine. This implies that the very possibility that marketers can cheat influences consumers’ choice and rejection to buy may be realized by consumers’ observation or belief. The cheating possibility and its realization are an example of Schrodinger``s cat.