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제3차 북한핵위기와 한국의 대응방안(영문)

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레포트 > 사회계열
2011.08.29
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제3차 북한핵위기와 한국의 대응방안(영문)

[북한학, 남북통일, 동북아시아, 핵위기] 북한학 리포트 - 북한핵 위기에 관한 연구(과거-현재-미래)

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[한국사회] 광복이후의 남한과 북한의 모습

[국제관계] 북핵 문제의 전개와 중국

제재를 통한 북핵문제 해결과정

부시행정부의 북핵 전략과 선택

소개글

제3차 북한핵위기와 한국의 대응방안(영문)에 대한 자료입니다.

Abstract
Ⅰ. Introduction
Ⅱ. Analyzing Methods
1. Beneficial points on analyzing through Game Theory
2. Explanations of games used to analyze
Ⅲ. The First & Second North Korean Nuclear Crisis
1. The First Nuclear Crisis – chicken game
2. The Second Nuclear Crisis – prisoner’s dilemma
Ⅳ. The Third North Korean Nuclear Crisis
1. Analysis through understanding intuitively
2. Analysis through understanding concrete situations
3. Solution
Ⅴ. Conclusion
References

본문내용

Brinkmanship can be an effective choice in chicken game. That is, if you rush toward the other in drunken, or pull out the handle, you can show you do not have any intention to avoid to the other. In this situation, the other person may think that he is the only person who can decide ‘to avoid’ or ‘to crush’. Thus, the other person will choose to avoid (because it is at least better than the worst choice). Through your rival’s choice, you can eventually have the best situation (NC); it is the ‘Brinkmanship’ strategy. Yet, brinkmanship strategy does not always give you the effective result. If your rival does not believe the fact that you would not avoid, both can face a ruin. In other words, if your rival’s gut is better than yours, brinkmanship strategy cannot be applied to the game.

(2) Bluffing Game
For this reason, if player A having credible threat uses brinkmanship strategy, player B becomes a chicken, which is same with prisoner’s dilemma structure. Thus, player B will have preference ‘NC>NN’ because of A’s bluffing. This game structure is called, ‘Bluffing Game’. The game table in Bluffing game is here.
Table 3. Payoff table of bluffing game
A B Cooperate No Cooperation
Cooperate (3,3) (1,4)
No Cooperation (4,2) (2,1)

(3) Bully game
In the chicken game, B’s preference is same as that of the dead-lock game, and A’s preference is that of the chicken game. Shortly, the preference of B is ‘CN>NN>CC>NC’, and that of A is ‘NC>CC>NC>CN’. B prefers NN to CC. The best payoff of B, CN is possible when A chooses C, and B chooses N. B’s dominant strategy is N, while A does not have any dominant strategy, so A has to choose a card which can avoid the worst situation. When A chooses ‘C’, the worst payoff is 2 and chooses ‘N’, the worst payoff is 1. Thus, it is rational for B to choose ‘C’. The game table of Bully game is as following.

참고문헌

References

Kim H, Choi JY. (2002) Uncertainty in Foreign Policy Making: A Bayesian Game Analysis of Korea. Global Economic Review, 31:25-40.

Bae JS. (2004) An Empirical Analysis of the Arms Race Between South and North Korea, Defence and Peace Economics, 15(4): 379-392.

Caplan B. (2000) Rational Irrationality: a Framework for the Neoclassical-Behavioral Debate, Eastern Economic Journal, Vol. 26, No. 2

David C. Kang, 2003, Nuclear North Korea: Debate on Engagement Strategies, New York : Columbia University Press.

Dick K, Emma C. (2010) North Korea: Economic Leverage and Policy Analysis, CRS Report for Congress

Hwang JH, 2006, “Analysis of 1st and 2nd nuclear crisis”, International Policy collection of writings, 46:1, p. 80

Jonathan D. Pollack, 2003, “The United States, North Korea, and the End for the Agreed Framework”, Naval War College Review 56:3, p. 44

Lee HK. (2008) Corresponding Steps and Further Approaches for North Korean Nuclear Solution through Application of Game Theory, Bargaining Theory, and Prospect Theory, The Korean Society for GeoSpatial Information System, Vol. 9, No. 4: 63-87

Mark EM, Mary BN. (2009) Assistance to North Korea, CRS Report for Congress

Morgan PM. (2006) Deterrence and System Management: The Case of North Korea, Conflict Management and Peace Science 23:121-138.

“Nash Bargaining Game.” Wikipedia, the Free Encyclopedia
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nash_bargaining_game

“Prisoner’s Dilemma.” Wikipedia, the Free Encyclopedia
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prisoner’s_dilemma

Shaun P, Yanis V. (2004) BARGAINING GAMES: Rational agreements, bargaining power and the Social Contract, In: GAME THEORY: A critical text, London, Routledge

Sonni Efron, 2003, “Bush Has His Reasons to Alter Tactics on North Korea”, Los Angeles Times, : Glenn Kessler, 2005/03/22, “Rice: U.S. and Allied Discussed ‘Options’ against North Korea”, The Washington Post.

Wrobel RM. (2007) North Korea after the Nuclear Crisis: the Future of the Economic Reforms, Post-Communist Economies 19(4):484-503.

Wang L., Chakabraty D., Goel G., Vazirani V., and Yu C., "Nash Bargaining Games.", Georgia Tech College of Computing

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