threat uses brinkmanship strategy, player B becomes a chicken, which is same with prisoner’s dilemma structure. Thus, player B will have preference ‘NC>NN’ because of A’s bluffing. This game structure is called, ‘Bluffing Game’. The game table in Bluffing game is here.
Table 3. Payoff table of bluffing game
A B Cooperate No Cooperation
Cooperate (3,3) (1,4)
N
Threat & North Korea Threat
We can’t skip the ‘China Threat’ and ‘North Korea Threat’ in dealing with US’s strategy toward Northeast Asia. China Threat has risen to the surface after Bush Administration. And the objective is ‘policy switch toward East Asia’ and ‘readjustment of US forces in East Asia’. Especially, ‘U.S.-China Security Review’ points to their fear for Ch
North Korea’s Perspective on International Relations under Kim Jong Il.” pp. 7
- 정창현, 2006, “핵과 국제정치, 북한은 왜 핵을 가지려 하는가?” 『10·9 한반도와 핵』, 이룸, pp.54-56
- 엄호건, 2009, “북한의 핵 무기 개발”, 백산자료원, pp.61-80
Possible strategy Efficacy & Practicality
Acquiescence Ⅹ
Denuclearization
(With reinforcem
from that of post-1986 Vietnam. For example, Vietnamese and NorthKorean foreign policies have had little in common in the last two decades, and this difference may have been interrelated with the dramatic contrast between Vietnam's economic boom and North Korea's recurrent setbacks. This subject is certainly worth investigating, since many of North Korea's current problems - inflation, high mi
I. Introduction
In the year 612 AD an Imperial Chinese army of more than a million soldiers marched on the northeast Asian kingdom of Goguryeo. Though vastly outnumbered, the soldiers of Goguryeo whom many modern-day Koreans see as their ancestors.
Now, almost 1,400 years later, Chinese scholars are claiming that the ancient kingdom of Goguryeo was a part of China’s "regional government fo