with the VCP leaders occurred in a period when Soviet and Vietnamese strategic interests started to diverge from each other. From 1981 on, the Kremlin made persistent efforts to reach reconciliation withChina, a precess viewed with distrust by Hanoi. Hanoi's reluctance to follow Moscow's example seems to have induced the CPSU leadership to put pressure on its independent-minded ally. Noteworthil
to assure Beijing that it was still committed to the One China policy. On August 1, Christopher delivered U.S. President Clinton’s confidential letter to Chinese President Jiang Zemin, which stated that the United States supported the One China policy and opposed Taiwan independence. However, Beijing was not satisfied with mere promises; it wanted “concrete actions ” on Washington’s
from that of post-1986 Vietnam. For example, Vietnamese and North Korean foreign policies have had little in common in the last two decades, and this difference may have been interrelated with the dramatic contrast between Vietnam's economic boom and North Korea's recurrent setbacks. This subject is certainly worth investigating, since many of North Korea's current problems - inflation, high mi
China. Thus, by comparing both China’s current and expected future situation, we’ve divided our sub-directions.
After implementing an open economy, China has been rapidly developing and eventually, they took a position as a 3rd leading nation in economic aspect. Also, with a 10% of growth rate (annually) they have been actively investing in education and technology to maintain their growth.
with most time being spent exchanging pleasantries, discussing travel and other such seeming trivia. It is important not to show impatience or irritation at this stage. Rather view the meeting for what it is - the essential first steps in creating a, hopefully, rewarding and long-term business relationship.
The Koreans also employ a process of consensus decision-making in certain situations. T