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분야
pptx- showing timeline
2. U.S counterstrategy against USSR’s locating missiles in Cuba
3. Policy Making Model
4. Implication
U.S action against Russia locating missiles in Cuba was typical strategy of escalation of maximized value.
- NSC(National Security Council) Administrative commission council
U.S treated it as a common thing.
It had been already long time that USA was in the range of Russian missile, so it was nothing special that Russia located missiles in Cuba. Rather, it was more dangerous for USA doing over action in that kind of situation because Russia could have made that situation worse; for instance, occupying Berlin. USA treated it as a common thing so that they could see through Khrushchev’s thought.
